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Introduction 
This series of Occasional Papers is designed to bring to the attention of the reader 
work that focuses on Asian communication and culture. Compared to most areas 
of Asian Studies, communication and media have been largely ignored, a fact the 
recent Australian 'push into Asia' reveals. These Occasional Papers redress this 
absence and deal with a comprehensive range of issues that inform our 
understanding of the importance of communication in forging links between 
Australia and Asia. Consequently their scope is far-reaching, covering cultural, 
political, economic, and increasingly, technological topics and their relationship 
to the communication process that lies at the heart of Australian/Asian relations. 
In short, they will chart a new emerging mediascape in the Asia Pacific region. 
As such they must be viewed as work in progress. The authors published in this 
series include academics, journalists and post-graduate students from Australia 
and throughout Asia. 
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1. Introduction 
Australia did not discover Cambodia until after the Second World War. In the 
early 1950s 'Indochina' was just becoming part of the Australian strategic map. 
In the wake of the Chinese revolution, the Korean W� and the collapse of French 
Indochina at Dien Bien Phu, Australia's 'Cold Warriors' were alerted to the new 
potential threats to our North. To counter these threats the ANZUS and SEATO 
Treaties were signed, coupled with anti-communist repression on the home front. 
In this political environment the media closely followed the dictates of the 
conservative Menzies Government in Asian affairs and foreign policy. 
The 'Anglophile' Australian media were far from being 'Asia literate'. 
Throughout the fifties and early sixties foreign affairs reporting closely 
mimicked the British and American 'neo-colonialist' lines with few exceptions. 
Indochina in this period was far from newsworth�: A survey of the Sydney 
Morning Herald between 1959-61 revealed on avefage no more than six news 
entries on Cambodia annually. 1 On the other hand, Indonesia, with the West Irian 
crisis and fears that Suharto's 'Guided Democracy' would throw up a dictator on 
our doorsteps competed with the perennial fear of Ch\na as the dominant 'Asian' 
issues in the Australian press. 
All this changed with the commitment of Australian ground troops to Vietnam 
to support the American effort in 1965. Vietnam was in the news, and along with 
the conscription debacle became a major media issue in the 1966 Federal 
elections. The Vietnam War compelled media institutions to improve their 
coverage of both the war and the region as a whole. In spite of this development, 
Cambodia remained the insignificant 'sideshow' and backwater. It was not until 
1970, with Sihanouk's overthrow and US-ARVN ground troops expanding the 
Vietnam conflict into 'neutral' Cambodia, that coverage increased. The US 
troops withdrawing two months later from Cambodia marked the start of another 
decline in news coverage. Nixon's 'Vietnamisation' program, and then 
Watergate, took centre stage as the big US television and wire services continued 
to swamp the Australian coverage of events in Indochina. America's Vietnam 
and American news priorities were still 'The Main Game'. 
In this context, the secret US aerial decimation of Cambodia remained a scanty 
footnote in the Australian media until it ceased in August 1973. It was only in the 
lead up and aftermath of the collapse of Phnom Penh in April 1975 to the Khmer 
Rouge forces, an event that eclipsed the fall of Saigon by two weeks, that global 
news media's attention was focused on Cambodia. It was yet again a short-lived 
focus. The new Democratic Kampuchea regime imposed a thorough media 
closure against the Western press. The news vacuum was replaced with 
speculation, black propaganda and some genuine horror stories of human 
suffering from border refugee testimonies. But Indochina on the whole faded 
from the international news pages as the West silently took stock of its historic 
defeat. Sporadic recriminations based on refugee accounts about the new regimes 
and war veteran legacies were featured periodically in the media. The enormous 
redevelopment and reconstruction problems of the Indochinese countries were 
ignored totally. 
_ Indochina re-emerged with a vengeance as an international news event on the eve 
of Vietnam's Christmas 1978 - January 1979 invasion of Cambodia and China's 
'teach them a lesson' coun�er-strike into Northern Vietnam the following 
months. The end of Democratic Kampuchea marked a massive schism in Asian 
and world Communist solidarity. From 1979 there was a gradual re-opening of 
Cambodia to the Western media. Thence followed a decade of selective, openly­
partisan and ideologically-driy.._en reporting of the Cambodia conflict as it became 
the centre-piece of regional and superpower rivalry. The Vietnamese troop 
withdrawal in October 1989 marked the beginning of a new media circus. The 
UN imposed diplomatic solution created visa openings for the 'scoop' hungry 
journalists of the world. The Western media itself at times became the issue with 
some observers drawing direct comparisons with the carpetbaggers and 
chequebook journalists that punctuated the Lon Nol period of the early 1970s. 
Australian news coverage of:Cambodia was now becoming more extensive. 
Freer access for both regional and Australian based correspondents, permanent 
Phnom Penh offices for wire services like Reuters and regional press and radio 
correspondents, like Sue Dowpie, meant a more reliable and consistent coverage 
of Cambodian affairs. Improved telecommunications after OTC's satellite hook 
up led to the first 'live' coverage of events witnessed on Australian television. 
But this was still sporadic coverage and orientated around big events like 
Sihanouk's return and the Khfeu Samphan attack. 
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In spite of a professed re-orientation 'towards Asia' at the political level in 
Australia from the early 1990s and a direct military involvement through 
UNT AC, the improved flow of news on the ground from Cambodia faced the old 
stumbling blocs of a continuing Anglo-Ameri�an and Eurocentric sense of 
priorities back in the Australian news rooms and, editor desks. Royal family 
gossip, the slightest twitch in the White House or� events in Moscow were still 
higher news priorities than events inside Cambodia. 
The low priority of Cambodia allowed old practices to continue. Visiting 
reporters flowed in 'on assignment'. Often poorly briefed and harbouring the 
'cultural baggage' of the Seventies and Eighties era, they repetitiously churned 
out the 'genocide' angle, Toul Sleng and Angkor Wat postcards, peppered with 
unconfirmed gossip gleaned from Hun Sen and UNTAC press aides which was 
usually thrown in as an afterthought to round off the report. There was very little 
serious in-depth reporting that explored the unresolved Khmer grievances 
created by the shortcomings of the UN peace plan. A few professional journalists 
briefed themselves with a modicum of Khmer language proficiency and 
attempted to dig out the real picture. 
The historical legacy of newly arrived foreign c9Frespondents being seduced, 
awed and fascinated by Cambodia, its Prince, its people and the temple Angkor 
Wat, was now being repeated. Like tourists in a strange land, imbued with the 
full canopy of Western preconceptions, the journalists were high on description 
but low on analysis. Edward Said's often cited denigration of Westerners for 
their 'Orientalism' was generally speaking an appropriate description of both the 
new breed and the old hands of the Cambodia school of journalism. There were 
· exceptions of course. However, most new correspondents infused their reporting 
with predictable references to the exotica, the despots, the mystical and the 
yearned for universalism. All of which served merely to dress up the Western 
prejudice that permeated the political dross in their reports. A dross invariably 
introduced by the words "diplomatic sources said". 
In short, many journalists revealed more about pre-existing Australian 
perceptions of this corner of Asia in their despatches than they did about any 
contemporary Cambodian political realities. The 'horror' of modern Cambodia, 
in the short space of time between the appearance of John Pilger's Heroes in the 
mid 1980s and Margaret Drabble's The Gates of Ivory in the early 1990s, had 
shifted its metaphor from the 'heroism of the messenger' to an 'imagined space 
for resolving Western conscience' .2 As Robin Gerster noted in his review of the 
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Drabble book, there was a certain cultural capital that had accumulated around 
the modern Asian holocaust. And it was one that more than a few Western 
writers were willing to cash in on. 
But more importantly, the Cambodian media legacy has its own rite de passage 
which each new correspondent must duly acknowledge before venturing into the 
somewhat unfathomable world of commenting on contemporary Cambodia 
affairs.3 The continued imposition of an 'outside solution' onto the Cambodian 
masses inevitably comes dressed up as 'international concern'. Rather than self­
examine copy for evidence of paternalism or neo-colonialism at work the 
Western correspondent seeks refuge for their uncertainty and self-doubt by 
reference to some transcendental or universal message that purportedly lies 
beneath the modern Cambodian tragedy. Witness David Puttnam's use of John 
Lennon's song Imagine to end The Killing Fields movie. 
But Puttnam's pairing of Western angst with Cambodian suffering was not 
original. The Australian novelist Maslen Williams travelled to Cambodia in 1969 
on an Australian writer's grant. From the comfort of his Phnom Penh Hotel, 
unaware of the country about to be swept into the Vietnam War, he penned, 
... The function that I have lately imposed upon myself as an Australian writer 
is to search this part of the earth for clues that may help to get us out of the 
maze in which we are all lo'fr, and wandering. I am one among many ill­
equipped literary diggers who fossick in the unlikely waste places of this age 
for specimens of truth that may lead to some rich lode of understanding from 
which we may all someday, enrich ourselves the people of all races - and 
begin to live a finer, kindlier, more courageous and mutually creative way of 
life.4 
The "Cambodia problem" has been with us for some decades now. An Australian 
approach of heavy involvement hi Cambodian affairs was developed in the 1960s 
and carried through the 1970s. Australians of various persuasions have 
distinguished themselves, often with some degree of controversy, in both our 
journalistic and diplomatic exctfanges with Cambodia. This 'finger on the pulse' 
trend intensified by the late 1980s with the emergence of a distinct Cambodia 
lobby in Australia consisting o{diplomats, journalists, aid workers, academics 
and others who collectively m�lded public opinion to accept a 'New
.
 S�dard 
Consensus' or revisionist view M contemporary Cambodian history.)Vhile the 
American media had an agenda-set, a Western media consensus of 'bloodbath' 
4 
and 'genocide' as the standard perjorative descriptions for the new regimes in the 
immediate post-1975 period emerged,5 the new media brokers or 'revisionists' 
sought to rewrite history with their own post-1979 version. The media-speak of 
the 'revisionists' involved creating a new consensus, one which exculpated 
Vietnam by presenting their invasion of Cambodia as a variety of humanitarian 
rescue.6 
• 
Today the supporters of the New Standard Consensus still have the upper hand. 
The proof of this is in the shifting media agenda for reporting Cambodia. An 
UNTAC force was sent to Cambodia ostensibly to verify the Vietnamese 
withdrawal and oversee the implementation of a peace plan. Now, most 
observers advocate that its fundamental function sh.ould be to contain the growth 
and influence of the Khmer Rouge faction. Were this just a case of bringing a 
recalcitrant party to the peace agreement back into line then there would be no 
qualms. But as the study below shows the new media agenda is a prescriptive 
one, one that insists that only certain outcomes are permissible, rather than one 
that impartially allows the Khmer to decide. 
The Western media worked to ensure the main beneficiaries of that 
'humanitarian rescue', (the Hun Sen's circle), emer� as the victors of the current 
power struggle in Phnom Penh that climaxed in the May 1993 election. The real 
problem lay in deciding whether the ultimate beneficiaries of this remoulding of 
W estem opinion will be the Cambodian people as a whole or some discredited 
elite that rules the country on behalf of themselves,'or worse still, some foreign 
patron. Thus to expect more than a modest correlation between the way 
Cambodia is reported in Australia and the way events actually beset the average 
Cambodian may be unduly optimistic. To understand why this discrepancy exists 
we have to unravel the legacy of Australian (and Western) journalism on 
Cambodia. A legacy that, unfortunately, has often worked side-by-side with 
forces seeking to undermine, rather than support, the Khmer independence 
struggle. 
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2. The Sihanouk Period (1953-70) 
Two Australians who distinguished themselves from early in the post-war years 
as prolific writers on Asian affairs were Wilfred Burchett and Denis Warner.7 
Politically these writers were ideological opponents. Both had covered the 
Japanese war in the Pacific, the Korean War, the French Indochina War and 
naturally became deeply involved in the American and Australian debate over 
our growing military commitment to Indochina throughout the 1960s. Of the 
two, Burchett reported the war 'from the other side'. His reports were often 
controversial and since the Korean War he was much maligned in Australia by 
conservative politicians and newspaper editorialists alike for his efforts. 
Despite such unpopularity Burchett was often much closer to the centre of action, 
in both the jungle warfare and the diplomatic sense. His close understanding of 
the inner-workings of both the Ho Chi Minh cabinet and the Sihanouk court gave 
him a unique Indochina perspective. Burchett first visited Cambodia in 19568 and 
the following year wrote Mekong Upstream9 which was published in Vietnamese 
by Hanoi. It became "the first beok about twentieth century Cambodian politics 
in any language".10 Where Burchett presented a vivid description of life in Phnom 
Penh where even he, like many other Western observers, 'romanticised' the 
Khmers.11 Cambodianist Ben Kiernan criticised Burchett's 'socialist realism' (in 
his description of the people) and his 'socialist imagination' (unfounded 
conclusion on the unity of Chinese, Vietnamese and Khmers) as unduly 
simplistic, but credited his portrayal of Khmer society and its "low living 
standards and occasional fierce exploitation at the hands of powerful members 
of the elite." 12 
But if Burchett's seminal work on the origins of Khmer communism and 
independence had been flushed out in Mekong Upstream, so too was another 
centre-piece of Khmer politics - an understanding of Sihanouk's neutrality. 
Burchett offered rare insight as ''his chapters on (Khmer neutrality) are based on 
his interviews with Sihanouk a)\d his valuable eye-witness accounts of the third 
and fourth congress of Sihanouk's party, the Sangkum in 1956 and 1957." Here 
Burchett described US Ambassador McClintock's disastrous walk out from the 
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Third Congress before Sihanouk rose to speak and clumsy US pressure on 
Sihanouk to join SEATO. Burchett concluded the real irony of Cambodia's 
subsequent 'slide to the left', was that it was precipitated by "the outrageous 
behaviour of the US State Department and its representatives in Phnom Penh."13 
Kiernan noted that Burchett felt, until then, Sihano'uk would have preferred in 
foreign policy a "neutralist, independent Cambodia attached to the West", but 
then goes on to recount from Burchett's private correspondence to his father, 
how in May 1956, while in Hanoi, he interviewed Prime Minister Pham Van 
Dong on Cambodian neutrality where the replies so pleased Sihanouk he used 
them in all of Cambodia's national media.14 In this sense Burchett was both a 
player in the game and a close-handed observer of �ambodian politics. 
From the opposite side of the political fence, Denis Warner's journalism was 
more in tune with the perspective of Australian and US military intelligence 
throughout his reporting career in Indochina. Naturally his writing gained a wider 
circulation in the daily Western press than that of Burchett. Warner had a deep 
insight into the developing peasant-based revolutionary warfare that steadily 
engulfed all of what was previously French Indochina, the nations of Vietnam, 
Cambodia and Laos. But unlike Burchett, Warner gjd not champion this cause. 
His writing was often in the form of a damning prophesy, criticising the bungling 
expediency of Western policy. He offered strategic analysis and advice on how 
best to contain the growing peasant rebellions, to halt the advance of Asian 
communism. In terms of Cambodia, this involved an understanding of Sihanouk 
neutrality. 
In Reporting South-East Asia, a Warner dateline "Pnom Penh February 1960", 
headed "The Prince on the tightrope", quoted Sihanouk outlining the rationale 
for Khmer neutrality as being akin to walking a tightrope. Warner added to this 
metaphor, "By his recognition of Communist China two years ago, Sihanouk 
seemed to have lost his balance in his delicate tightrope act." Proof came from 
the apparent pro-China line on the Tibet crisis and the 'anti-Americanism' of the 
Cambodian Ministry of Information.15 Thus Warner was sceptical of Sihanouk's 
denial of 'the Red Prince' label dubbed on him by the Western press. 16 He berated 
Sihanouk's claim that the Cambodian and other Third World people would 
eventually "decide the fate of the under-developed countries". He equated 
'neutrality' with 'soft on communism' and argued, "to many (Westerners) it still 
seems that Sihanouk has opened the country to the challenge of competitive 
coexistence on Communist terms and that Peking, not the people, will decide 
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Cambodia's fate."17 The spirit of Bandung and non-alignment seemed anathema 
to Warner. 
Warner wrote extensively for the Australian press, most notably, the Melbourne 
Herald. His Reporting South-East Asia book included articles on Cambodia from 
the American Reporter magazine written between 1959 and 1966. In the prelude 
he described the the collapse of Anglo-American relations with Cambodia in the 
mid-l 960s as "one of the sorriest Southeast Asian stories". He argued, 
Sihanouk's sense of "national pride" was "belatedly understood". Ignoring his 
own record, Warner added that some Western publications, notably Time and 
Newsweek, continued "to denigrate the prince and his country in terms 
apparently calculated to give the most offence", provoking the Sihanouk 
response of "shameful slanders". 18 
Such deference to the Prince from Warner was not an accident. In the book 
Before Kampuchea, former Australian diplomat and journalist, Milton Osborne, 
recalled how Warner himself had incurred the wrath of Sihanouk. When Warner 
first visited Cambodia as a journalist in 1960 he arrived in Phnom Penh in the 
company of the then Cambodian Ambassador to Australia, Poe Thieun and his 
nephew Poe Deuskoma. Warner's reportage of this visit to Cambodia, as it was 
subsequently published in an Australian newspaper, was found to be derogatory 
of the Royal family by Prince Sjhanouk. Warner was banned from re-entering 
Cambodia and become the first of a long line of journalist casualties to cross 
Sihanouk. 19 
Sihanouk's periodic bans on the Western press reflected how many 
correspondents on assignment in Cambodia often did not realise fully that 
covering Cambodia was not the same as covering Vietnam. In Vietnam there 
were ground rules to avoid censored copy. In Vietnam there was a degree of 
certainty over what was acceptable coverage to the US military's media minders, 
the Saigon regime functionaries and the editors at home. The pattern in 
Cambodia reporting was less certain. The various CIA manoeuvres in 
neighbouring Laos kept Sihanouk wary of any who challenged his definition of 
Khmer neutrality. Nevertheless, until the US Embassy closed in 1965, the 
Sihanouk form of neutrality was an inclusive, rather than exclusive one with 
foreign aid and foreign visitors arriving in Phnom Penh from all points on the 
globe. 
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One journalist who successfully negotiated Sihanouk's quirky mannerisms and 
perceived volatility was the Australian cameraman and journalist Neil Davis. 
Davis in late 1963 was appointed the first Visn�s cameraman in Southeast 
Asia.20 Working out of Singapore from February 1964 he shared the ABC 
office.21 He first went to Cambodia in November 1964 to cover the independence 
celebrations. His footage of Angkor Wat for Visnews was shown to Prince 
Sihanouk whose interest in film led to a warm relationship between the two. It 
was useful for Davis in obtaining visas at latter dates when the country was semi­
closed to journalists. On this 1964 trip Davis also met Burchett and taught him 
how to use a cinecamera. The result was Burchett filmed the Vietcong in action 
and Davis sold his footage to Visnews and later to CBS.22 
Burchett had moved to Cambodia from North Vietnam in September 1965 and 
resided in Phnom Penh for four years. When welcomed to Phnom Penh by 
Sihanouk he brought tidings from the President of the NLF (South Vietnam), 
Nguyen Huu Tho, and evidence of a Khmer Serai/CIA plan to overthrow 
Sihanouk's neutral government.23 Such exploits became legendary and earned 
him the appellation of 'Public Enemy Number One' from Australian 
conservatives. The more adventurous Australian correspondents like UPl's 
Martin Stuart-Fox made contact with him and publrshed his dissident voice in a 
series of short articles for The Australian newspaper.24 
Others weren't so lucky. In 1966 ABC correspondent Tony Ferguson and an 
ABC film crew managed to get into Cambodia which was officially closed to the 
Western media. Ferguson secured an interview with Wilfred Burchett and 
despatched the footage. As Tim Bowden noted in his biography of Neil Davis, 
" ... Meanwhile, in Sydney, all hell broke loose. Burchett was regarded by many 
in Australia as a traitor - a view shared by the ABC's Controller of News. He 
ordered the Burchett film to be destroyed on arrival. It never even made the 
processing lab." Neil Davis, in Australia on leave in 1967, criticised ABC 
censorship in an interview granted to the ABC in Melbourne. The News Editor 
of the ABC in Sydney rebutted Davis. The Australian ran with the story and 
exposed the machinations of censorship in the 'free' Australian media.25 
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3. The Lon Nol Period (1970-75) 
The Neil Davis-ABC management confrontation over censorship was 
symptomatic of wider developments both inside Australian society and at the 
cutting edge of the war itself. In Vietnam the Wes tern press corps by the late 
1960s were highly cynical of the official line - whether from government or 
military level. Many came to adopt a position of open hostility to the American 
war effort. The widening of Vietnam's ground war into neutral Cambodia in 
1970 was greeted by the Saigon press corps with incredulity. Many of them 
packed their bags and shifted to Phnom Penh to cover a new stage of a war they 
thought was winding down after 'Vietnamisation' signalled the American ground 
withdrawal some months before. 
The coup which overthrew Prince Sihanouk in March 1970 and the US/ARYN 
land invasion in May 1970 put Cambodia squarely into the international 
spotlight. Western journalists flooded into Phnom Penh to cover what would be 
a five year civil war. Apart froll},Davis, other Australian journalists to grace the 
Hotel Royale in this period included many who were prominent in Australian 
media and political circles like Bruce Grant, Creighton Burns, Neil Jillett, 
Michael Richardson, Peter Hastings, Tony Joyce, John Pennington, Richard 
Carlton, Peter Couchman, Pat Burgess, Richard Palfreyman, Denis Warner, 
David Jenkins, Neil Kelly, John Pilger and Allan Dawson.26 
But news coverage from Cambodia in this period is best remembered by the 
camera work of Neil Davis, .later immortalised on the David Bradbury 
documentary Frontline. Davis biographer Tim Bowden argued during this period 
Davis achieved "the most graphic combat footage of his career".21 Indeed, 
Cambodian news coverage wa� often a more hazardous terrain than Vietnam. 
The battle lines were seldom clear and erupted unexpectedly from behind civilian 
lines. Tim Bowden noted that most newsmen covering the action in Cambodia 
were wounded more than once.28 In October 1974 Davis himself wrote a 
despatch for the Far Eastern':,Economic Review where he noted that nine 
pressmen had been killed up to that time in the Cambodia war and that twenty 
two foreign pressmen were missing. 29 
JO 
Bowden claims Davis maintained his political: neutrality throughout his 
Cambodia encounters. But Davis reputedly picked up.a weapon on one occasion 
to help defend a Cambodian government (Lon Nol ¥JTIY) position that was about 
to be overrun because he knew "few reporters suryived capture by the Khmer 
Rouge" as "prisoners were seldom taken."30 Later::;0n in the Davis biography 
Bowden recounts how Davis attempted to suppress ·this story when on leave in 
Australia, denying its authenticity to enquiring local journalists. 
Bowden excuses Davis here with the comment that iPDavis felt he was perceived 
as less than impartial back in Cambodia it could jeopardise his future mobility to 
report the war. But after Davis' death in Bangkok in the mid - 1980s, Bowden 
ventured to the Thai border camp and interviewed former Lon Nol military 
strongman, now leader of the anti-communist KPNLF, one General Dien Diel. 
In his article for The Australian on the meeting, Bowden acknowledged 
uncritically General Diel 's claim that Davis was a close supporter of the 
KPNLF' s political program and the friendship between the two stretched back to 
the Lon Nol days.31 
Ironically, given this retrospective revelation about the possible political 
allegiances of Neil Davis, it was the political Lef�and not the anticommunist 
lobby in Australia who benefited most from the popularising the memory of the 
heroic camera work of Neil Davis during the Indochina wars. While Bradbury's 
Frontline backed up the claim to neutrality, the decision of Davis to cover the 
wars with ARYN and Lon Nol troops was construed·in Australia as confirmation 
that it was "their war" and not that of the Americans and the Australian junior 
partner. The respect that Davis expressed for the tenacity of the defeated armies 
of the ARYN and Lon Nol regime stood in contrast to his cynical view of the 
American reliance on military technology. It was a view that reinforced the Left 
argument that the locals were pawns of the Americans. 
Even more significant was Bowden's claim that Davis maintained a healthy 
respect for the Vietcong in Vietnam even though he travelled with their 
opponents the ARYN in the battlefield. As noted above, it was not a respect that 
extended to their communist comrades in neighbouring Cambodia.32 This may 
not be so surprising given that Davis was not covering Vietnam during early 
1975 routing of the ARYN' s positions when the NV A - led assault generated a 
massive civilian panic and a hostile Western press over the high casualty rate. 
Instead Davis was in Phnom Penh witnessing similar violence from inside the 
besieged city. 
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As the Khmer Rouge encircled Phnom Penh in early 1 975 they mounted a 
general rocket attack on the city. Davis filmed one of the most horrific incidents 
- a direct hit on a school on 6 February 1975. He agonised whether to film or help 
with the bodies, "I felt revulsion and anger against the Communists. At the same 
time I knew I must cover this story to get the best possible stark and bloody film, 
to show exactly what the people of Cambodia had to put up with. After the war 
ended, it became apparent that the Khmer Rouge were the most repressive and 
bloody regime of recent times, so it wasn't surprising in retrospect that they did 
what they did before the end of the war."33 
With more than a touch of irony, Davis met two of Austral ia's opposition 
politicians Andrew Peacock and Ian Sinclair after they had flown into Phnom 
Penh on I April 1975 on a 'fact finding mission' .  Peacock used his influence 
with the Americans to assist Davis in flying out of Phnom Penh just days before 
the collapse and the beginning of Democratic Kampuchea.34 Davis went on to 
make history, returning to Saigon in time to film the first NV A tank crashing 
through the gates of the Presidential Palace, the symbolic event that signalling 
the final end of the Vietnam War . 
.. 
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4. The Democratic Kampuchea Period 
(1 975-78) 
The fall of Phnom Penh to the Khmer Rouge in April .) 975 marked a new period 
of closure as far as Western media coverage of Cambodia was concerned. It 
marked also a qualitative shift in tone of what news was despatched about the 
war torn country. The horrors of war became the horrors of 'genocide'. A recent 
film documentary3' revealed there was a concerted campaign by key leading 
newspapers of the Wes tern world to saddle up the new Democratic Kampuchea 
regime with labels like 'bloodbath', 'genocide' and 'one million executions' well 
in advance of any substantial evidence to support such claims. Henry Kissinger, 
the architect of the massive US bombing of Cambodia, was quoted in The Age as 
deriding the 'genocide' inside Cambodia just days after the Khmer Rouge 
victory. 36 
The Western media elites, primarily through the news flow of the international 
wire services, invoked an 'atrocity' syndrome whenever reference was made to 
the new Democratic Kampuchea regime. This campaign was based on little 
proven collaborated evidence at that stage. Reductionist speculation and 
stereotypical journalism became the norm of what was at best scanty reporting. 
Democratic Kampuchea chose to ignore Western public opinion to its own 
detriment.37 Two texts based on interviews with Khmer refugees leaving 
Democratic Kampuchea for the Thai border refugee camps over the following 
eighteen months achieved notoriety in this regard. They were the John Barron 
and Anthony Paul's Murder of a Gentle People which found a global circulation 
through Reader's Digest magazine and the French priest, Father Ponchaud, with 
his Cambodia Year Zero. Both books, based extensively on refugee testimonies, 
were reviewed widely in the Western press. Their mass circulation ensured the 
status of the definitive standard reference texts on Democratic Kampuchea's 
gross violations of human rights. The Australian based academic, Michael 
Vickery, later coined the phrase "Standard Total View" (of Cambodia) to 
describe the emergence of this media orthodoxy. 
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The fall of Phnom Penh was recorded by a number of Western journalists who 
had remained behind in the French Embassy after 17 April, 1975 collapse of the 
Lon Nol regime. The escapades of these journalists later became immortalised in 
the popular memory by the 1984 Hollywood film The Killing Fields. The docu­
drama style of this Hollywood production was problematic. On the surface its 
dominant theme, the heroism of the Western journalists versus the despotic and 
faceless Third World Asian dictators, coincided too neatly with Hollywood's 
other mythical post-war celluloid reconstructions of Indochina to totally measure 
up to its claim to 'truth' .  But Academy awards and 'real life' characters from the 
scripted story were powerful enough to override any serious academic criticism 
of what was in many ways an Orientalist and racist soap opera. 
Thus the reconstruction of history through Hollywood's The Killing Fields 
became canonised as the official documentary history of the fall/l iberation of 
Phnom Penh. Producer David Puttnam claimed his film was true to the original 
Sydney Schanberg storyline. The problem for historians today is deciding how 
much of the fragments offered by the Western journalist storyline - from 
correspondents like Sydney Sohanberg and John Swain - can safely claim the 
status of authenticity, presenting the 'whole picture' ,  or even part truth, from 
what was the turmoil and maelstrom of revolution in Cambodia April 1975. 
The New York Times correspondent, Sydney Schanberg, and The Times 
(London) correspondent, John Swain, emerged later as the most prol ific of the 
bewildered bevy of journalists arriving by road at the Thai border in early May 
1975 after being expelled from the French Embassy compound by the new 
regime. Within hours of reaching Thailand, the syndicated articles on the capture 
of Phnom Penh, written by journalists like Swain and Schanberg were widely 
republished in the overseas and Australian press.38 Their accounts, based as they 
were on rumours about the evacuation of the capital and some observations of 
the countryside during their dash for the border, were validated retrospectively 
by the 1984 release of The Killing Fields which retold their story from their own 
vantage position. 
The Schanberg/Swain view of the new Democratic Kampuchea regime as it 
appeared in the Australian press was highly critical. They speculated that the 
takeover of Phnom Penh and i,ts subsequent evacuation was in all likelihood a 
'bloodbath' .  More cautious and sceptical accounts from the American freelancer 
Richard Boyle and the Australian academics Shane and Chou Meng Tarr were 
ignored by the Western media.39 This was despite the fact these people had at 
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least experienced the new Cambodia from outside the French Embassy. Yet 
Schanberg and Swain, compiling their syndicated reports from inside the French 
Embassy, were credited as the only Western witnesses to the rustification of 
Cambodia. 
As the Englishman John Swain flew into Phnom Peilh from Bangkok on the last 
flight to land in before the Khmer Rouge took over, 40 Neil Davis was flying out 
to Bangkok. Davis briefly re-entered Cambodia from the Thai border to film the 
Khmer Rouge taking Poipet on 19 April. He wasihen bundled back over the 
border into Thailand. 41 From the Thai border Davis departed the growing 
contingent of journalists gathering there and slipped back into Vietnam to record 
the fall of Saigon on 30 April 1 975.42 Meanwhile the Thai border emerged as a 
key listening post for news from inside the new Democratic Kampuchea. Initially 
some journalists crossed over to see for themselves. As the border became sealed 
it was a case of relying on reports from escaping refugees and monitoring Khmer 
Rouge radio. The entourage from the French Embassy emerged to a huge media 
fanfare in early May 1975 with heroic tales of their daring deeds to be lapped up 
by a global media. 
Joining these ranks at the end of his appointmeiit to Beijing was the ABC 
journalist Paul Raffaele. Raffaele's report, when 'viewed in retrospect typified 
what became the 'Standard Total View' on Cambodia reporting. His assertion as 
to the trail-blazing nature of his brief trip inside Democratic Kampuchea bears 
the familiar imprint of a war correspondent in sear1>h of the dangerous mission. 
Headed "Do you know the penalty for this crime?" the radio report was broadcast 
on the ABC's Correspondents Report July 1975.43 A written version appeared six 
years later in the anthology Then and Now: ABC Correspondents Abroad. 
Raffaele claimed, "I broadcast my findings on ABC news and current affairs 
radio in Australia - and shortly afterwards heard Prince Norodom Sihanouk 
denouncing me by name on Radio Phnom Penh. The world press took up the 
story, swarming into the Thai border area with Kampuchea to seek out the gory 
details of Pol Pot's version of the 'Final Solution'." 44 
Raffaele positions himself on the Thai side of the Kampuchea border near 
Aranyaprathet, "weighing up the likelihood of surviving to tell the story" should 
he breach the Khmer Rouge border patrol.45 Armed with a valid Peking press 
card, Raffaele scrambles over the barb wire with a Thai translator in tow to 
become "the first Western journalist to set foot back in Kampuchea". He was 
confronted by soldiers who were all "about sixteen or seventeen", yet still 
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"seasoned fighters". They were the same ones that "swarmed into Phnom Penh". 
Next their superior arrives and accuses Raffaele of "violating the security of our 
border". Then Raffaele conducts an interview with "the first senior Khmer 
Rouge official to talk to a Western correspondent since the takeover in Phnom 
Penh." 46 
In the Introduction Furlonger noted the impossibility of publishing or even 
retaining the huge volume of despatches that arrive from overseas to the ABC. 
Thus the book "pays only inadequate tribute to the correspondents who have kept 
Australians aware of what is going on in an often remote world." The book is 
dedicated to "the many men and women whose bravery and suffering provided 
(the younger generation of journalists) with at least some semblance of a 
heritage-however imperfect." 47 
Raffaele states " . . .  He was guarded and his replies were often deliberately vague; 
but he did confirm that the cities had been abandoned in a bid to force the people 
to adopt a primitive rural socialism. He went on to admit that education had been 
suspended, that famil ies were J:>eing split up, and that an unknown number of 
'class enemies and agents of imperialism' had been put to death. "48 The interview 
apparently ends with the military commander of the Khmer Rouge western 
border division berating Raffaele, "You should not come into Kampuchea! We 
do not want your corrupt capiurlist kind here! That is why we expelled all the 
others ! You broke our law by coming into Kampuchea illegal ly! This time we 
will let you go because of our friendship with China! If there is a next time - we 
will kill you!" 49 
Maybe the ABC's editor did not wish to detract from his journalist's scoop with 
its emphasis on the perilous nature of his correspondent's journey.50 However, 
even two years later, in 1 977, that is as late as two years after the border closure, 
Australian freelance cameraman, Walter Burgess, working for Visnews, made 
three trips into so-called impenetrable Cambodia from different starting points 
along the Thai border side. Travelling with the right-wing Khmer Serai, Burgess 
penetrated between eight to thirty kilometres into the countryside. He shot film 
of canal diggings, villages, mines, and rotting bodies. 51 
The Raffaele story also recounts how "several" western yachtsmen, blown off 
course, were taken to Phnom Penh, "tortured and killed".52 But the final written 
edition of the Raffaele story fails to edit "several" yachtsmen down to "two" 
yachtsmen to make it historically accurate. This would appear imperative. The 
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incident had not even occurred in July 1975. Its inclusion in the 1981 printed 
edition suggests additions were made to the original Raffaele radio despatch to 
embellish it. Presumably, such additions were inserted by Furlonger, the book's 
editor. If so, did not Furlonger have a responsibility to make those additions as 
accurate as the contemporaneous record allowed? In.deed, the 1981 publication 
date fell after the date the Australian press first headlined the story of the missing 
Australian yachtsmen captured by the Khmer Rouge. Otherwise why tamper at 
all with the 1975 despatch? 
A similar objection arises over the Raffaele story being loaded up with the 
familiar cliches and expressions that punctuated other anti-DK reporting in the 
1977-80 period in the works of John Pilger, Barrqn/Paul and Ponchaud. The 
Raffaele story recounts events with a depth of knowledge that had not entered the 
established record at the time of his reporting. Examples abound, such as, 
" ... Mercilessly, these 'children of the revolution' swept Phnom Penh and 
Kampuchea's other cities clean of people, forcing them at gun-point out into the 
countryside. The ill and the dying were dragged from their hospital beds and 
made to march or to crawl along with the other hundreds of thousands of terrified 
men, women and children on their way to the new 'socialist reality' . 
. . .  Those who collapsed by the wayside were disposed of. The lucky ones were 
bayoneted or shot. The majority were dragged into the bush and bashed to 
death with hoes and shovels. Those who survived were forced to hack new 
villages out of the jungle, living on starvation rations until the crops they had 
just planted should be capable of harvesting. And when that occurred, they 
still received only one small tin of rice per person, per day, provided they 
behaved themselves . . . The new Jerusalem became a gigantic chamel-house 
as those who had served the previous government, those who had been 
misguided enough to acquire an education .. . were systematically tortured and 
beaten to death in their hundreds of thousands. 53 
We could ask where Raffaele get all this information just two to three months 
after 17 April 1975? He claims to have "spent my first few weeks at the border, 
talking to many of the thousands of refugees streaming across from the new 
Communist state." He claims he was "sceptical at first" but as the stories were 
repeated "by new refugees pouring through more and more boltholes in the 
border" he was "convinced of the truth of their horrifying tales."54 Whatever 
stories Raffaele was able to glean in this brief interlude up to July 1975 on the 
Thai border the reliability of the above account is more in keeping with an early 
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1980s consensus than with the confusion and uncertainty of the first few months 
after April 1975. 
Like Raffaele, most US and UK sourced accounts of the early years of the DK 
regime were characterised by unmitigated hostility of the Raffaele variety. The 
Asian regional press was a little more circumspect and speculative. For example, 
the respected regional weekly the Far East Economic Review gave a guarded, but 
critical, overview of the first year of the DK rule in its 29 October 1976 edition. 
It read, ''Throughout 1976, the KCP appeared to be capable of supporting those 
people it chose to support at around subsistence level." The account added, 
" . . .  this was no mean achievement given that Washington estimated that one 
million Cambodians would starve. Perhaps fewer than 25% of that number 
actually starved in 1975-76".55 
Given that inside Democratic Kampuchea was effectively sealed off from the 
Western media between 1975-78, it was not surprising that many supporters of 
the Indochinese revolutions remained unconvinced by the 'sour grapes' of the 
vanquished superpower and its press minions epitomised by the wire services. 
The mainstream Australian press generally followed the lead of AAP, Reuters 
and AP news flow with its barrage of criticism on the new Democratic 
Kampuchea regime. While stories like the Raffaele one were the norm there were 
still sceptics in the West includ_ipg Australia. 
A handful of the more serious researchers sought to establish the 'real truth' . The 
method was to search for contradictions amongst the plethora of anti-Khmer 
Rouge propaganda surfacing in the Western media. This belated defence of DK 
was later referred to by scholar Micheal Vickery as 'the literature of denial' .  It 
was the reverse side of the prejudicial press distortions. In Austral ia, the 
Cambodianist academic Ben Kiernan exposed as fakes some press photos of an 
alleged Khmer Rouge execution.of civilians. The photos were actually staged in 
Thailand and then distributed to the foreign press in return for money. But his 
exposure was found not in the offending daily press, which published and 
republished the photos above a ronflicting array of captions, but in journals with 
minusc�!::.�
culation like the Melbourne Journal of Politics and News From 
ost detailed sifting through of the Western press coverage of Democratic 
p chea between the years · 1975-78 was performed by the noted American 
scholar Noam Chomsky. In a detailed study called The Reconstruction of an 
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Imperial Ideology: The Political Economy of Human Rights (Volume Two), 
p�ed in early 1 979, he attempted to show that much of the media on 
�emoc_ratic Kampuchea was little more than 'distqrtions at third hand' where 
unreliable refugee accounts of atrocities had been l;lastily gleaned, unethically 
extrapolated, and then repeatedly circulated, as t� media's 'standard total 
view'. 57 
' 
It was not until late 1 978 when US journalists Elizabeth Becker from the 
Washington Post and Richard Dudman from the St Louis Despatch joined the 
Dutch-born academic Malcolm Caldwell in a visit to Democratic Kampuchea 
that the hope of an independent assessment from Western media observers 
emerge.58 But Caldwell' s  assassination by unknown gunmen dampened this 
hope. Becker and Dudman's reports in the US press were reprinted subsequently 
in The ustralian but only as a backdrop to coverage of the Vietnamese invasion 
w had begun as the delegation departed Phnom Penh. Both journalists were 
" tical of the human rights record of the DK regime, but Dudman confirmed that 
Western news reports appeared to have been exaggerated for propaganda 
purposes.59 
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5. The Post-Invasion Media Story (1 979-91 ) 
The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in 1979 occurred during the highpoint 
of the Fraser led Liberal Government's geo-strategic orientation in foreign 
policy. It was a period of heightened superpower rivalry between the US and the 
USSR which climaxed with the invasion of Afghanistan and the rise of 
Reaganism in the USA. To traditionalists on the Left and left liberal intellectual 
circles it was the 'Second Cold War' .(,J) In this period Vietnam was defined as a 
pawn of the Soviet Union. Its invasion of Democratic Kampuchea was 
confirmation to political conservatives of both the old 'Domino Theory' and the 
'Soviet thrust' into Asia. 61 
Vietnam, while widely condemned by Western politicians and editorialists for its 
invasion, was still considered by many in the West as the "acceptable face of 
Asian communism". This was because the alternative, a continuation of 
Democratic Kampuchea under Pol Pot, was perceived as a darker option. Left 
opinion was initially divided . .  Academic Gavan McCormack appraised the 
relative merits of the defence c'ase for Democratic Kampuchea in the Melbourne 
intellectual journal Arena, under the heading 'The Problem of Knowing the 
Truth".62 In summary, he condemned the human rights record of the DK but 
conceded the advent of black propaganda spread by the invading Vietnamese 
probably ensured a clean weighing up of the evidence over the 1975-78 years 
would now be more difficult. 
But the issue was cloudy for the .. strategically-minded media analysts as well. The 
choice between two evils (DK and Hanoi) found more than a few accepting that 
Vietnam could become a bulwark against a resurgent Killing Fields. This 
uncertainty Jed to what Cambodia Watching called 'elite ambivalence' in 
Australia's media institutions. there was a clear proprietorial division over what 
was to be the correct response to the rights and wrongs of both the Vietnamese 
'invasion' and the Pol Pot 'genocide' .63 Hard-liners saw the issue in terms of 
East-West Bloc politics. But an increasing number of print media commentators 
- foreign affairs journalists and Jeadin� academics - switched from rbeic 'antj., 
commynism' premise of the earlier Vietnam War days to a new 'understandlng' 
of Hanoi's geo-strategic move into Kampuchea.\ 
r-
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Such a turn around, increasingly reflected in editorial positioning throughout the 
1980s as the PRK position became more secure, owing its initial success to the 
new information brokers of the Cambodia cQntlict the aid workers, the 
documentary filmmakers, the academic Cambodian specialists and selected 
journalists - most of whom reinforced a "New Stl!Jldard Consensus". The key 
aspect of which was to play down the shortfall of Vietnam's protegees in Phnom 
Penh, lest public criticism contribute to a resurgence of the Khmer Rouge. They 
filtered the news in a way that presented the Phnom Penh authorities (PRK/SOC) 
as a variant of Western liberalism while the opposing factions in the Resistance 
(DK/CGDK/NGC) were depicted as savages, uncivilised, terrorists, murderers, 
Hitlerites, etc. Undoubtedly, the appalling track record in human rights of the DK 
regime made this task much simpler. 
A leading player here was the Australian expatriate and high profile journalist 
John Pilger. He was one of the first Western ·ournalists allowed into the 
Vietnamese controlled Kam uchea in mid- 1979, ostens1 · the UK 
base am. rom this visit Pil er filme 
inv · n as e coun ay m waste as a result of the war that had djsrupted crop 
planting and also precipitated massive mobilisation and dislocation of the people. 
In his widely acclaimed documentary, Cambodia Year 'Zero, Pilger sheeted home 
the entire blame onto the Khmer Rouge:-Cambodza Year Z Ti orld 
was a propaganda coup or t e P K and the Vietnaroe�e. � 
The relative inertia of the press in reporting the DK years was now compensated 
for in 1979 by massive press exposure through wire service photos of The Killing 
Fields. Positive as this development was in redressing the balance of the previous 
years it was still liable to ideological distortion. The new lexicology of "Pol Pot 
regime", "genocidal maniac", "irreversibility" and "comprehensive settlement" 
sprung up in the media as an impediment to serious analysis from any side. 
Sloganeering replaced debate as the much needed aid deliveries to Cambodia and 
the refugees on the Thai border became a media centre-piece in the controversy 
over the morality of invasion versus the morality of human rights abuses.64 
In late 1979 the Melbourne Herald serialised Pilger's "Asian Holocaust" spread 
from his London Daily Mirror expose. Before long the 'Pilger effect' of 
';P1'Sading journalism meant all news reports on the Cambodia war from 
_/Bangkok, Singapore, Phnom Penh or even Australia were obliged to lead with 
reductionist commentary as "responsible for the deaths of over one million 
people" within .the leading paragraphs. Politically, however, this shock 
2 1  
journalism was not standardised until the more 'middle-of-the-road' journalists 
like Micheal Richardson adopted it. A pile of skulls graphic adorned his mid-
1980 front page report for the Melbourne Age. The Age editorialised in favour of 
Australia's de-recognition of the DK Government at the UN General Assembly 
vote in the same issue. Pressure mounted with Pilger's Cambodia: Year One 
screened towards the end of 1980. It claimed the Cambodians were suffering 
because of the Western diplomatic logjam preventing humanitarian aid reaching 
the people. 
The Cambodia debate in Australia coincided chronologically with the Liberal 
Party leadership struggle between Andrew Peacock and Malcolm Fraser. In 
February 1981 the leadership issue came to a head as Peacock resigned the 
Foreign Ministry over a policy difference with Fraser on Cambodian 'de­
recognition' .  Peacock had earlier chosen on the high rating 60 Minutes current 
affairs television program to launch 'a frontal attack on Fraser over Cambodia. 
Peacock forced Fraser's hand and delivered Australia's Cambodian policy up to 
the pro-Phnom Penh lobby. Fraser's geo-strategic viewpoint was now 'on the 
nose' as far as the media was concerned. The Cambodia policy was now driven 
by the domestic media's revulsion against the Khmer Rouge human rights abuses 
and not by Prime Ministerial and Cabinet solidarity with the US and ASEAN 
vision of regional security. 
• ·IJi
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But the United Nations sponsored International Conference on Kampuchea in 
late 1981, Vietnam boycotted, and the ASEAN-sponsored formation of the 
Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea in June 1982 which gave the 
DK a veneer of respectability that the pro-Phnom Penh media lobby found hard 
to dislodge. As media academic Rod Tiffen noted: 
. . .  Since the Australian government announced its derecognition of Pol Pot, 
the news coverage about Ka_mpuchea has been accurate in detail but 
misleading in drift. Most reporting about Kampuchea has been centred on the 
reponing of official statements and diplomatic actions of countries opposed 
to Vietnam, seeking its withdrawal from Kampuchea! Despite editorial 
stances to the contrary, we have had neutral reponing of these diplomatic and 
political initiatives with little irulication not only that they lack reality, but that 
if they were effective in removing Vietnam from Kampuchea, they would 
increase the instability of Kampuchea and the misery of its people. The result 
has been the accurate reponing of diplomatic fictions. This is a dilemma for 
the press and one that shows it9 vulnerability. 65 
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Tiffen here shows one side of the complexity of reporting Cambodia during the 
1980s, when the on-going war cost well over a hundred thousand military and 
civilian casualties, but because it didn't match the �cale of destruction and loss 
of human life of the 'Pol Pot period' it remained poorly reported.<"' In short, there 
were either other more pressing international ca:!,amities or the media had 
relegated the issue to the backburner. The noted English journalist William 
Shawcross toured Australia later and contextualised this as Western 'compassion 
fatigue' and 'political amnesia' where global crises are news today gone 
tomorrow. , 
On the other hand, Cambodia had remained as a centre-piece or a 'pawn' of 
global and regional diplomacy at a time of massive.:shifts and challenges in the 
international power balances in the mid- 1 980s. Hence reporting of diplomatic 
initiatives, and inter alia 'diplomatic fictions' ,  reflected both the posturing of 
great powers in the media and the sensitivity between the Khmer belligerents 
over the nuances of any settlement terms.67 (Often the argument was about 
seating arrangements at conferences!). It was a sensitivity that the specialist 
journalists pursued with professional skill but was largely lost on the editors, sub­
editors and general public with their desire for easy solutions. Similarly, the 
diplomatic response to the 'Cambodia problem' often underpinned trade offs in 
a host of other bilateral areas. For example, Australia's high profile on 
Cambodia, as far as Indonesia was concerned, was predicated on our soft­
pedalling the East Timor issue. Again the subtleties escaped the quick-fix school 
of journalism.68 
The desire for simple answers partially explains the success of people like John 
Pilger who could reduce everything into a sequence of television frames and 
emotive pleas so that the public 'understood' .  But his presentation of the issues 
to a viewing or reading audience in a 'black or white' manner, without any shades 
of grey, soon led Pilger ' s  critics to cry foul and accuse him of promoting 
'diplomatic fictions' as well. The leading Pilger critic in Australia was the 
conservative commentator Gerard Henderson. In a typical anti-Pilger press 
commentary Henderson picked up on the British press attack on Pilger's 
Cambodia Year II: The Betrayal.69 Henderson challenges what he called the 
Pilger conspiracy theory where, "Such a complicated scenario (as Cambodia) 
lends itself easily to conspiracy theories, at which John Pilger excels - witness 
his claim that a 'trinity' comprising "Pol Pot, Washington and Peking - assisted 
by the likes of Singapore, Britain and (apparently) Australia - is taking ill defined 
actions which will see the Khmer Rouge restored to power." 70 
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The only point of agreement between the Pilger and Henderson camps was over 
Foreign Minister Hayden's 1986 proposal for a Genocide Tribunal which was 
pushed heavily in the media by academics and aid workers to bring Pol Pot to an 
international court for 'genocide'. But even here the Henderson camp sought to 
tar the Phnom Penh authorities (many of whom were ex-Khmer Rouge) with the 
same brush. The media high point of this 'genocide' debate was in the 1987-88 
period when Hayden's successor Senator Evans refused to succumb to Australia 
pushing the initiative. Evans had reservations that were partly technical, partly 
hypocritical - a desire to appease ASEAN, particularly Indonesia over East 
Timor, and an unwillingness to totally surrender the Khmer Rouge card to Hanoi 
and the PRK except in the context of a full settlement of the Cambodia issue.71 
The Evans peace plan, in the wake of the Vietnamese withdrawal in September 
1989, required a further tactical retreat on the Genocide Tribunal issue, if only to 
bring the Khmer Rouge faction into the peace plan. This plan saw a further 
redefining of the media's elite consensus as now Evans was obliged to defend his 
imaginative peace plan against Pilger and others who argued it was a 'Trojan 
Horse' for the Khmer Rouge regaining power. Evans sought to use diplomacy to 
engineer simultaneously a pro-US, pro-PRK solution that required constant fine 
tuning. Otherwise media attention was deflected away from history and reality 
(the on-going ground war) towards diplomacy media-speak.72 
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The media greeted the UN peace plan with mild euphoria, as did Canberra's 
public relations mill. Attention switched to a threatened military re-emergence of 
the Khmer Rouge. As this threat intensified in the media the Vietnamese and 
PRK dug in and quibbled over the fine points of the peace plan tha� would foist 
power sharing with erstwhile enemies upon them. 
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6. The UN Cambodia Peace Plan (1 990-93) 
a) Press Optimism on the Cambodian Peace Plan 
As noted in the earlier section the media coverage of the Cambodian war centred 
more on the endless round of international diplomatic meetings aimed at 
reaching a negotiated solution. From the international conference in Paris held in 
August 1989 the Western media contingent that followed these talks became a 
key player. They relished the opening up of Cambodia to outsiders when the 
Paris Conference despatched an interim UN military inspection mission to 
Cambodia and the border camps under the Norwegian General Vadset. 
Sympathetic coverage of the Phnom Penh administration during this mission set 
a precedent that ensured the massive Western press contingent was allowed into 
Cambodia to 'monitor' the official 'final' Vietnamese troop withdrawal at the 
end of October 1 989. 
The international press were satisfied the Vietname� troops had fully withdrawn 
but the Khmer Rouge and other resistance factions still insisted on UN 
verification. Not surprisingly, when the Khmer Rouge made 'significant military 
gains' after the withdrawal date there was a "backlash in the West" where there 
was "waning political support" for the resistance .�rmies. Far East Economic 
Review journalist Nate Thayer maintained the Khmer Rouge, in particular had 
always faced a "vocal rather cacophonic rejection of an develo " that 
assisted the' es ern o sition " the 
exten o sympathy that continues exist for the Khmer Rouge an<Ltheir 
programs" anEl this unacknowledged tact would result in an undermining of the 
"prospeets fo1 a wmkable, Sustamed solut n". ,:,-
If one wanted to find evidence of press coverage designed to isolate the Khmer 
Rouge and drive them away from the peace table it would be hard to surpass the 
Australian press in this period. The diplomatically reached solution in Cambodia 
was generally celebrated, and Australian journalists persisted with their dual 
theme of alienating and vilifying the Khmer Rouge faction as much as possible. 
The peace talks at Pattaya in July and August 199 1 bringing the four Khmer 
factions together were a case in point. 
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The meetings themselves were greeted optimistically by the Australian press.74 
But coverage of the talks in Australia continually ignored presenting any analysis 
of the progress of the confidence building measures aimed at achieving a 
workable solution. Instead the 'Pol Pot factor' was used to dress up what was 
otherwise rather thin copy. Sam Lipski in The Bulletin devoted almost an entire 
page length column in the national weekly to a rumour that Pol Pot was in 
Pattaya, only to conclude, that even if the rumour was "totally erroneous", it still 
showed "US intelligence sources" were worried that the "Khmer Rouge remain 
strongly in the picture."75 The Age correspondent Lindsay Murdoch, reporting on 
the second round of talks in August, continued this media obsession with Pol 
Pot's whereabouts. His despatch "Reporters hunt for mysterious Pol Pot"76 was 
given the same prominence as the much more immediate and serious issue "Hun 
Sen to clash with US over peace plan."77 
The alternative issue, optimism over the prospect of peace, gained even greater 
media prominence following the 'Perm 5' (UN Security Council) meeting 
endorsing the progress of the Khmer factions. The Telegraph Mirror reported 
"Peace for Cambodia" and "'The war is over- Sihanouk"'.78 Less sensational was 
the Sydney Morning Herald 79 ·with "Peace talks end on hopeful note" and an 
editorial, "Sowing peace in the killing fields", where it was suggested the Phnom 
Penh Government was moving away from its hardline position of objecting to 
KR participation in the election process.8() The Age editorial, "Welcome progress 
on Cambodia", was optimistic lnd endorsed the Evans proposal with: 
Proponents of the plan believe that involving Pol Pot 's organisation in 
peaceful avenues of change is the only way to prevent a return to the years of 
bloodshed. So far so promising . . .  Senator Evans has been persistent in 
following through the initiative that the UN took as the basis for its proposal. 
He uses the phrase "niche diplomacy" to describe the task and Canberra 's 
role. Khieu Samphan sees a lasting ceasefire ... as dependent on a UN 
monitoring force. 81 
The Australian 's editorial, "Playing our part in ending a nightmare", on the New 
York UN General Assembly ,meeting in September 199 1 provided further 
optimism82 It began, "The elimination of the final obstacles to the signing of a 
settlement between the warring factions in Cambodia represents a victory for 
quiet Australian diplomacy. Senator Evans's strength has been to refine the 
methods of his predecessor (Hayden) and to work with our regional allies, 
particularly Indonesia ... "83 The editorial concluded by noting a breakdown of 
order in Cambodia that may endanger our troops, but added we should have the 
"strength of our convictions" to ensure the peace plan is kept.84 
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The Weekend Australian ran a commentary by Bangkok-based British journalist 
James Pringle, reporting from Phnom Penh, following the signing of the Paris 
Accords in late October 1991 .85 Pringle reported "cautious optimism" under the 
heading "Phnom Penh awaits new peace". He noted the widespread availability 
of guns in the capital and the fragile peace as the .Cambodian masses awaited 
Prince Sihanouk's promised return. He added the t�king down of Ho Chi Minh 
and Lenin portraits was "a symbol, perhaps, of an old order passing." Alan 
Boyd's despatch, "Treaty marks the beginning of the end of Asia's cold war", 
reported optimism from Hanoi where "Western diplomats say the breakthrough 
(in Cambodia) is expected to spark a flurry of activity by Vietnam which is 
anxious to heal the rift from the war with its suspicious neighbours." 86 
In the wake of the UN decision, The Bulletin 's Laurie Oakes praised Senator 
Evans and his department as "Deserving of praise".87 Oakes criticised Liberal 
Opposition Foreign Affairs spokesman Robert Hill for his claim in July 1990 that 
"any comprehensive settlement involving a role for the Khmer Rouge was really 
not going to succeed." Oakes noted Hun Sen was to visit Australia "in 
recognition of our contribution". Yet there is an "extraordinary reluctance" on 
the part of the media and the Opposition to acknowledge this achievement. 
Oakes argued there was something in (the Evans plan) for "everyone except the 
Khmer Rouge." Even China would want to restore its international image in a 
post-Tienanmen era by " weaning themselves off overt support for Pol Pot".88 
In a move that won much applause from the Australian media and perhaps 
bloated the importance of journalists and politicians alike, Senator Evans 
persuaded the PRK/SOC's Prime Minister Mr Hun Sen to visit Australia before 
returning to Cambodia from Paris. The tour was a diplomatic success for both the 
Hun Sen faction and Senator Evans. On 27 October , Bruce Jones in his Extra 
column in the Sun-Herald claimed "Australia rescues a nation in turmoil" in a 
whole page of glowing commentary to Hun Sen and his chaperone Senator 
Evans.89 Greg Sheridan was equally praiseworthy in The Australian where his 
article was headed (Senator Evans) "Midwife to a fragile Cambodian peace".89 
Nobody in the media even remotely suggested that Australia might be 
compromised in the eyes of the other Khmer factions."° 
At the same time the advanced contingent of Australian Peace Keeping Force 
troops were being readied to be sent to Cambodia. The day after Hun Sen arrived 
in Australia the Sydney Morning Herald Defence Correspondent Greg Austin 
informed "Aust troops for Cambodia told they won't have to fight."91 The report 
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carried a photo of Hun Sen and Evans, smiling side by side, during a joint press 
conference in Canberra. Hun Sen, captioned in the photo "The Cambodian Prime 
Minister" was more accurately referred to in the body of the article as "a member 
of Cambodia's Supreme National Council which includes representatives of the 
Phnom Penh Government and the three resistance factions". 
The Austin article noted that Hun Sen assured Evans "that Australian troops 
would not get bogged down in any military quagmire" thus implying Hun Sen 
had sufficient control of the countryside to enforce such an undertaking. Austin 
noted a convergence of interests with his observation "Mr Hun Sen and Senator 
Evans debunked press speculation that the Khmer Rouge was still a strong force 
that could scuttle the peace plan". As columnist Frank Devine later revealed in 
The Australian the Hun Sen visit was arranged to shore up the credibility of the 
Evans Peace Plan and assuage public concern over the safety of Australian troops 
in their Peace Keeping role in Cambodia.92 
Implied in Hun Sen's comments was a guarantee that the Khmer Rouge would 
be nobbled under the Evans Plan. The Sydney Sun-Herald in late December 
199 1  provided further evidence. A number of academic supporters of Hun Sen 
indicated a switch from the Pilger hard-line view over to the Evans camp. Keith 
Gosman's article noted, "in a disastrous year for the Federal Government, the 
Foreign Minister's Cambodia initiative has gained Australia precious prestige in 
the international arena." Dr Adrian Vickers claimed Evans had won "an immense 
amount of respect" in the region. Dr Gary Klintworth, slightly more guarded, 
said, "although he didn't agree with the entire thrust of Senator Evans proposal 
(he) would not take anything away from him". Dr Stuart Fox gives the original 
impetus to Bill Hayden, but adds a "full marks" to Senator Evans. All three 
academics alleged the Khmer Rouge signed the agreement because of their 
"military weakness". Gosman warned the Khmer Rouge may still "spoil the 
Senator's diplomatic tea party" as Hun Sen's administration with its 
"considerable Western support, not the least from Australia" faced protests in 
Phnom Penh over "widespread and notorious corruption" wherein "the 
imposition of external solution� remains, as always, a part of the problem."93 
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(b) Sihanouk's Return to Phnom Penh November -
December 1 991 
After years of debunking Sihanouk for his refusal �o be pinned down to a fixed 
diplomatic position the Australian press begruqgingly acknowledged the 
powerful symbolic role his return to Phnom Penh played in the peace process. 
The Sydney Morning Herald editorial "Cambodia's Next Experiment"94 claimed 
Sihanouk's return marked "the end of Cambodia's long nightmare of death and 
destruction punctuated in the late 1 970s only by a genocidal attempt at social 
experimentation." It also marked "a radical experiment" by the UN where "UN 
peace keeping forces will monitor the cease-fire and disarm the belligerents. UN 
administrators will run Cambodia's internal affai-rs until elections are held in 
1993 and then oversee the transfer of power to a new government". It concluded, 
"Sometimes it is necessary to take a calculated leap into the unknown. This is one 
of those occasions."95 
Under the heading, "Return of the Profligate Son", Lindsay Murdoch, posed the 
question "Can a hon vivant who has spent the past 13 years in cosseted exile 
rescue a country devastated by war, disease and poverty?" This was the cover 
feature December issue of the Good Weekend Mag�ine circulated with both the 
Sydney Morning Herald and The Age.96 Significantly, the article reported that the 
return of the first of the Khmer Rouge officials to Phnom Penh had occurred 
without incident. It noted the return of Khmer Rouge General Mao Sary from 
Bangkok with a photo caption that ran, "Large nu�bers of police together with 
poor communications initially minimised protests against the Khmer Rouge's 
return".97 
(c) The Khieu Samphan incident and the media 
November 1 991 
A Lindsay Murdoch article published the previous October, just two days before 
Khieu Samphan was due to arrive in Phnom Penh, was entitled in the Sydney 
Morning Herald as "Khmer Rouge puts damper on peace pact". It dismissed 
Khmer Rouge security fears surrounding the return to Phnom Penh of Samphan 
to take up his SNC role as an attempt to sabotage the implementation of the Paris 
peace agreement. Murdoch argued that Samphan's fears of assassination would 
"scuttle" the SNC meeting scheduled to be held soon after his scheduled arrival 
in Phnom Penh. He concluded on the point, "Hun Sen refused a Khmer Rouge 
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demand for a Vatican-like enclave, protected by UN soldiers .... They should rent 
a villa and live in the city like anybody else, he said.'"'8 
The next day, the Weekend Australian ran a more neutral heading, "Security 
threat to Khmer return", in a report from Phnom Penh by James Pringle who 
noted fears over security concerned not only the Khmer Rouge leaders but Prince 
Sihanouk's entourage as well. The report confirmed that both parties had every 
intention of taking up their SNC offices in Phnom Penh.99 Son Sen, a political 
representative of the Khmer Rouge on the SNC, had already flown into Phnom 
Penh and taken up residence in the faction's compound. It was reported there 
were a few protestors outside but the event had passed without incident. •m 
On 27 November, Khieu Samphan, the second D.K representative on the SNC, 
flew into the capital. The cavalcade from the airport was greeted with a peaceful 
student protest. However after arriving at the Khmer Rouge compound, a crowd 
outside violently ransacked the building, beat up Khieu Samphan and attempted 
to lynch him with a belt on the overhead light hanging. SBS-TV' s Dateline 
program had their journalist �ark Carey on the spot. Reporting live via satellite 
on the attack on Khieu Samphan, Carey's agitated voice and exciting dialogue 
gave the impression that it was a spontaneous protest by a frenzied and enraged 
crowd. Neither Carey, nor for that matter Paul Murphy anchoring the program 
back in Sydney, could disguise.Jheir glee at the events. No doubt most of the SBS 
viewers would also have felt that if Samphan and Son Sen were lynched then 
they were only getting their 'just deserts'. In the heat of the moment obviously 
the total derailing of the peace process was a secondary consideration by these 
Australian journalists. 101 
In the same vein, Lindsay Murdoch, reported on the incident, from Singapore, 
for The Age on the following day under the heading "Khmer leaders attacked on 
retum".102 He stated, " ... Demonstrations against the return of the Khmer Rouge 
began yesterday. Several thousands of students marched through the city 
demanding the Khmer Rouge be evicted." He also claimed, "At Phnom Penh 
airport thousands of people �creamed "Killer !" and "Traitor !" as the Khmer 
Rouge leaders arrived from Bangkok." And after the compound was ransacked, 
"The Cambodian Prime Minister, Mr Hun Sen, went to the house shortly after 
Mr Khieu Samphan arrived to try to calm the mob and save the Khmer Rouge 
leaders, who were trapped ... "� 
30 
Sue Downie reporting on Radio Australia the d�y after the attack threw a 
different light on the event. She stated there was a lot of talk around the Phnom 
Penh amongst Khmers that strongly suggested Hun Sen bore responsibility for 
initiating the protest. She emphasized the danger !)f the entire peace process 
being derailed. This view was backed up by a well researched article in The New 
Yorker by Stan Sessor. 103 Sessor began by noting the �dominant media images, 
... Foreign press photographers sent around the world two unforgettable 
pictures: Khieu Samphan, a frightened white haired man of sixty, with blood 
streaming down his face . . .  then wearing a helmet . . .  ending up in an 
armoured personnel carrier of the Cambodian Army, and were taken to the 
airport and put on a plane to Bangkok. They retumed to Phnom Penh a few 
weeks later, this time carefully guarded by troops of the Hun Sen government. 
Many publications wrote about the incident as a case of an enraged 
population that couldn 't bear to see its former torturers retum. 
Two days later The Sydney Morning Herald appeared with the editorial heading 
"Samphan ran out of town again", which argued, " . . .  No-one is suggesting 
Wednesday's frenzied attempt to extract revenge on Mr. Samphan was planned. 
But it could have been more carefully guarded against." 11" The same day The 
Adelaide Advertiser ran an AFP wire report under the heading "Hun Sen regrets 
attack". 10s In this report Hun Sen accepted "full responsibility" but claimed his 
"personal intervention" had rescued Samphan. Further, Hun Sen was reported as 
saying "the mob were enraged by memories of the Khmer Rouge killing of more 
than one million people during their rule". Hun Sen also "denied reports that his 
government had organised the protests or that it had sent agents to provoke the 
violence." 
Sessor, like Downie, was dubious as to Hun Sen's innocence as to the origin of 
the protest. He suggested the international press were sucked in. He gave the 
example of a Washington Post editorial, which, following the line of the 
Australian press, argued, " ... Forgetting the past means forgetting the people who 
were murdered. That is precisely what the Cambodian people are unable, and to 
their credit, unwilling to do". Sessor notes that the Hun Sen government sought 
to reinforce this impression. A Foreign Ministry official attempted to explain it 
this way to him. Sessor conceded the Khmer Rouge were partially to blame by 
not sending in fresh faces to represent themselves. Nevertheless, he concluded, 
"While Cambodians had every justification for rising up in anger and attacking 
the Khmer Rouge compound, the fact is that nothing in Cambodia happens 
spontaneously. "11"' 
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(d) UNTAC and Continued Fighting in 1 992 
Reporting Cambodia (in early 1992) mainly centred on two issues - the ongoing 
fighting between the Khmer factions and the decision to commit 500 Australian 
soldiers for the UNT AC Mission. Press enthusiasm for the use of Australian 
troops in a peace-keeping capacity in Cambodia remained high. The Daily 
Telegraph Mirror ran the human interest line with "Women for War Zone" and 
announced twenty women would be among the 500 strong peace keeping force 
from Australia. Prime Minister Keating, was quoted in the same article saying, 
" ... The soldiers will not be used to enforce or impose peace in Cambodia. If we 
conclude there is no longer a peace in Cambodia the Australian and other UN 
forces will have to be withdrawn."io7 
By March 1992, The Age foreign editor Mark Baker was more dubious. In an 
article about the continuing arms build-up by the big powers in South East Asia 
he referred somewhat cynically to the "ostensible outbreak of peace in 
Cambodia".108 Perhaps he had been reading the regional press where Thailand's 
leading paper the Bangkok Post reported, "UN officers allege Vietnam units still 
in Cambodia" and anonymous "senior UN military officer" said "elite 
Vietnamese units are still operating in Cambodia". UN sources estimate 
"hundreds" disguised as Cambodian soldiers while the KR allege "thousands" ... 
even non-KR Khmers remain "d(?eply suspicious of Vietnam's claim that it has 
withdrawn all its forces". Khi!u Samphan said last month "fighting would 
continue until UN forces disarmed all the factions and verified the withdrawal of 
Vietnamese troops".1w 
In a series of articles for The Australian in April-May 1992, James Pringle 
covered the logistics of UNTAC and the visit of United Nations Secretary 
General (21 April 1992), positioning of Indonesian troops in Kompong Thom 
(27 April 1992) and the first Si��ophon to Phnom Penh train journey since the 
Peace Plan (23 May 1992). In the latter article he noted, "in their propaganda 
broadcasts, the communist Khmer Rouge say there are still Vietnamese troops in 
Cambodia, although they pleaded they were out in 1989 ." In a wire service report 
the same day 110 General Sanderson reported delays in implementing the peace 
program "including verification of the Cambodian ceasefire and the 
demobilisation and cantonment of forces". No mention of verification of the 
Vietnamese withdrawal issue w�s made.1 1 1 
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e) The Australian Parliamentary Debate Endorsement 
of the Full UNTAC Commitment (April 1 992) 
In late March 1 992 the press offered some scepticism over the pending decision 
to commit the bulk of Australia's forces to the UNTAC group. The issue was 
fanned in the media by statements by various Liberal opposition spokespeople 
questioning the government's alleged secrecy over the decision and the fact that 
the peace agreement seemed to be coming unstuck on the ground. 1 12 The latter 
view was supported by various reports emanating from Cambodia itself of 
continued fighting between the Khmer factions. 1 1 3  
The Sydney Morning Herald editorial "Before o,µr troops go to Cambodia", 
maintained Australia was about to commit 500 troops to Cambodia as the peace 
plan was "in serious danger of coming unstuck". Blaming the Khmer Rouge for 
wounding Australia's Colonel Stuart in a helicopter attack, the Herald argued 
responsibility for the ceasefire breakdown was more evenly distributed as 
"warring factions" had a "patchy" record in observing the ceasefire. In Kompong 
Thom, the fighting was between "Khmer Rouge guerillas and government 
troops". The paper warned against "an open-ended involvement", concluding it 
was "a bit too late to be backing out, but not too late to vent anxieties".' 14 
Under the heading "Killing fields give no peace of mind" The Australian backed 
up this fear of an open-ended commitment. The special Parliamentary debate 
would have to provide answers to "some awkward questions about the nature of 
the role the Australians will serve, and the dangers they will face", as the Khmer 
Rouge remained a "malevolent force, recalcitrant to the last and having lost none 
of its talent for pure old fashioned thuggery". It was concerned on how our forces 
would change from peacekeepers to peace enforcers if the Khmer Rouge "turns 
feral with the peace process in mid-stream". The paper endorsed the flexible line 
adopted by the ALP, conceding, "the structure of unilateral forces are still 
evolving", the UN operates in a "nebulous" zone between "peace settlement 
negotiation and military enforcement" as, UN peacekeeping, by its nature, occurs 
in an "ad hoc manner."1 15 
The Canberra Times was somewhat neutral with "Australia sends 500 to 
Cambodia". 11 6 The Financial Review stressed troop security with "Keating 
pledges troops' safety". 117 The Age took a dimmer view "Peace in Cambodia may 
yet bring battle at home", noting "Australia's diplomatic successes in Cambodia 
have not translated well on the domestic front."1 18  The Sydney Morning Herald's 
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"On into the killing fields", argued if the Liberal Opposition's "carping" prior to 
the April 1, statement was "opportunism" as the ALP was alleging, then the ALP 
Government was in turn guilty of having had prior to this date "too casual an 
approach to details of our commitment". The Herald, reminded the ALP 
Government had stressed troops were "peace-keepers and not peace-enforcers", 
a distinction "much more reasonable here than in the killing fields themselves." 
Keating stressed Australian troops were not going to Cambodia "to impose a 
settlement" and we will withdraw them "if civil war breaks out again". The paper 
noted that if the "going gets tough" then "bipartisan political support for this 
commitment will be crucial". 1 19 
The Australian editorial on 3 April, "Treading warily in Cambodia", warned 
"Were peacekeepers in Cambodia to become embroiled in combat, not only 
would the intervention fail but the .UN would be weakened in its resolve." 120 
Frank Devine's column in the 'op-ed' pages of The Australian argued, "why 
send word ahead that our soldiers, if threatened, would not fight? To deprive 
soldiers of bellicosity is to endanger them. To announce in advance that their 
response to being attacked will be withdrawal, is to invite attack upon them."121 
But Devine stops short of openingly advocating a full frontal attack on the 
Khmer Rouge. He suggests that issue will be determined by resolution of the 
much vaunted issue of"how deeply we really wish to be involved in Asia. Ankle­
deep? Knee-deep? Deeper?" He restates this more formally with "Canberra's 
apparent hedging of our Cambodia commitments is an indication of how 
wrenching it is to step from cosy contemplation of enhanced trade into 
confrontation with some of our visceral attitudes to Asia". 122 
As the Khmer Rouge stalled, for various reasons, on accepting the UNTAC 
implementation of the Paris Agreement on a troop cantonment, the ferocity of the 
anti-Khmer Rouge propaganda reached a new height in Australia. Former 
Liberal and Democrat politician Don Chipp, who was sponsored on a trip to 
Vietnam and Cambodia in early April on behalf of the NGOs with the aim of 
increasing Australia's aid donations to Indochina, argued in his column in the 
Sydney Sunday Telegraph, written before his departure, and headed "Pol Pot 
continues with the slaughter". Chipp took the moral high ground. He argued that 
foreign policy was about "national interest and self-preservation" whose legacy 
was endless "agony and suffering" because, whenever applied, results in "ends 
justifies the means" selfishness, which in turn leads to some countries, 
(Australia), with a normally higli "level of national morality", allying themselves 
"to contemptible forces to protect their own interests temporarily". 
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This introduction was Chipp's  lead up to his deploring, "the sponsorship and 
protection given to one of the most revolting creatures.ever to disgrace this planet 
- Pol Pot, the imbecilic leader of the Communist Khmer Rouge in Cambodia." 
Simplifying history, Chipp then apportioned blame for the Third Indochina War. 
He argued Pol Pot was "supported in tum by the Ch�nese, the US, Australia and 
the Thais." After he (Pol Pot) "tortured, maimed and killed between one and three 
million of his own people he fled from the liberating Vietnamese army in 1979, 
he has been given sanctuary by corrupt generals of Thailand ... (where) he is still 
killing and maiming innocent villagers ... ". 123 
(f) The Press and Peacekeeping in the New World 
Order? 
After the Parliamentary debate coverage the media temporarily dropped the issue 
of Cambodia except for some casual coverage of the positive side of Australian 
peace keeping in Cambodia, the dangers of facing further flare ups, the dangers 
and slowness of the mine demobilisation programs, the upsurge of internal 
refugees from the renewed intensity of the fighting and the failure of the 
promised UN development aid to arrive from donor countries. 124 
However, the press were also laying the ideological groundwork for the 
seemingly inevitable contingency that the UNT AC peacekeepers may have to 
change into peace-enforcers at some future date. For backing up the Devine and 
Chipp viewpoints was the more sophisticated argument of defence and strategic 
specialist Gary Klintworth in The Australian in June 1 992. 125 Klintworth began 
with, "Human misery in Bosnia-Herzegovina has made the previously 
unthinkable quite thinkable: the idea that States can intervene, and may have a 
right to do so, in the domestic affairs of other states, even to using military force 
when the objective is clearly humanitarian. This shift in favour of a "right to 
intervene" ranks among the most important consequences of the post-Cold War 
attempt to establish a new world order." 
Klintworth then reflected on how the New World Order would affect the 
Cambodian situation with, " The dilemma for the UN and the international 
community in reconciling realpolitik, humanitarian priorities and the importance 
of the principle of non-use of force, are reflected in the Cambodian peace 
settlement. The UN has sent personnel to Cambodia to keep the peace and to 
prevent a "return to the universally condemned policies and practices of the 
recent past" - a euphemism for the killings in Cambodia under Poi Pot. Yet the 
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West and China have guaranteed the Khmer Rouge's inclusion in the Cambodian 
political process because to exclude them would be to condone the Vietnamese 
overthrow of the Khmer Rouge regime."126 
Klintworth concluded, " ... While the UN could take no practical action in 
Cambodia in 1978-79, it may be less unwilling to act in the future for two 
reasons: the growing acceptance that sometimes there is an obligation on the UN 
to intervene, and the commitment of Security Council prestige to achieving a 
lasting peace in Cambodia. In the new world order, UN intervention on 
humanitarian grounds would be acceptable to most States, if it were seen to be 
impartial, consistent, transparent, and limited in its objectives."121 
(g) The "1 3 June 1 992" Cantonment Deadline and the 
Renewed Targeting of the Khmer Rouge by the 
Media 
The thirteenth of June had been the date settled on for the cantonment of 70 per 
cent of soldiers of the four Khmer factions, (Phase Two), under UNTAC 
supervision. As the date approached, it was obvious that the Khmer Rouge was 
unwilling to comply. The press response in Australia was savage. The Sydney 
Morning Herald 12 June editorial "Cold comfort in Cambodia" looked 
sceptically on Senator Evans -assurances that the Khmer Rouge were engaged 
only in "brinkmanship" in refusing to demobilize its army. The paper claimed the 
Khmer Rouge had ''regularly violated the ceasefire since a peace plan was signed 
by Cambodia's warring factions last October." The paper cited the KR's refusal 
to allow the Head of UNTAC, Mr Yasushi Akashi, entry into territory they 
control in Western Cambodia the previous fortnight and their rejection, at the 
emergency UNT AC/Khmer faction meeting, of "all appeals to join the 
demobilisation process" . 128 
The Herald dismissed as 'red herrings' the specific Khmer Rouge demands 
concerning UNT AC verification of the withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops and 
their insistence of the elevation of the SNC to a "de facto government with 
legislative and executive powers" in place of the Hun Sen administration. The 
paper argued, " ... UN observers are satisfied there is no significant Vietnamese 
troop presence in Cambodia I\Tld common sense suggest Hanoi has nothing to 
gain by concealing one. But tfie Herald in its editorial does not identify which 
UN officials were 'satisfied' its to the total Vietnamese troop withdrawal or 
whether 'satisfied' is the same thing as confirmed. '29 
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On the second point, the Herald argued, 
. . . As to the SNC, it was established to represent Cambodia externally and to 
advise UNTAC. But the everyday running of C�mbodia was to be left to 
UNTAC until a freely elected government comes.-into power next year. To 
demand changes to that arrangement now means scuttling the October peace 
accords and going back to the drawing board. 
But here the paper ignores that "everyday running of Cambodia" was still in the 
hands of the Hun Sen faction and not UNTAC. UNTAC had failed to take up 
their complete responsibilities because of Hun Sen's refusal to hand over power 
of the key ministries. If anything, it was UNT AC that shared the blame as it was 
'scuttling' a key plank of the peace plan by abrogating its administrative 
responsibilities. 130 
The Herald then foreshadowed the new direction of UNTAC by quoting 
UNTAC Military leader General John Sanderson saying, "the UN peacekeepers 
have no mandate to enforce the peace plan. They do have a responsibility to 
protect factions which comply with the plan." The editorial concluded that even 
if Evans was right on the "brinkmanship" issue, the JQ)mer Rouge actions and its 
protests "at this late stage"131 raised a serious question about whether it (the KR) 
"can be trusted to honour the result of elections it is almost certain to lose next 
year". Then the paper described Keating's April statement to pull Australian 
troops out if it was judged that the situation was "beyond redemption" as "good 
sense". It concluded, "Ultimately, only the Cambodians themselves can make 
peace. If, in the end, the Khmer Rouge chooses to do otherwise, we will need to 
look for a new approach entirely to that challenge." But the paper did not 
elaborate on what this new approach would be. 132 
The Australian editorial on 15 June, "Disarming the Khmer Rouge" 133 took a 
similar line. It chastised the "intransigience" of the Khmer Rouge for its "totally 
unreasonable demands", which were a "frightening reminder of that 
organisation's record", as there was "no evidence that there are Vietnamese 
forces in the country, certainly not in such strengths as to hinder UNTAC or to 
strengthen the position of Hun Sen's government." Again the proof of this was 
not verification but simply the political assertion that Vietnam would not want to 
"alienate all those countries now giving it the aid it so urgently needs". As to the 
demand for "plenary powers to the SNC" this was probably because "the Khmer 
Rouge estimates that it will fail to win the foreshadowed elections". Writing well 
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before the KR had withdrawn from the election process, The Australian 
predicted that once the ejection of a democratic government occurs next year 
then the onus is still on nations such as Australia to be 'vigilant' and "offer the 
Cambodian people our help to prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning to 
power."134 
(h) September 1 992 -The Keating Visit to Phnom Penh 
Press coverage of the Keating visit stressed its morale boosting role for 
Australian troops and the flagging optimism of the whole UNT AC operation in 
the light of the KR failing to meet the June 1992 deadline for disarmament. His 
visit was overshadowed by his Japan visit that immediately proceeded it. The 
'whistle-stop' one-day visit to Phnom Penh, the first by a residing Western Head 
of State, was perceived domestically in the Australian media as part of his build­
up to the Australian Federal elections. It was also read as an attempt to dissipitate 
fears that Australia was getting cold feet over Cambodia's peace plan. 
The Sydney Morning Herald/Age Goodweekend, anticipating the Keating visit, 
ran a story coinciding with the Keating visit by Sydney Morning Herald foreign 
affairs correspondent, Tony Wright, "Pall over Phnom Penh, Cambodia's new 
found peace is marred by poverty" . 135 Wright concluded this report by praising 
Australia's role in the peace pr(lCeSs and saying that it will improve our image in 
Asia even if our involvement is seen as "a finely balanced process between 
compassion for a tortured people and pragmatic benefits for Australia". As for 
the condition of Phnom Penh, Wright argued, "Even if it has brought with it the 
ugly aspects of a real estate speculation boom amid poverty, and even if it forces 
Australian officials to carry bags of cash across borders it is better to light one 
small candle than to curse the darkness". The context of this comment was his 
observation that an Australian foreign affairs official had carried $600,000 in US 
banknotes to purchase a new Embassy for Australia in Phnom Penh. A building, 
we were told, that had already increased in value to $2.7 million in just a few 
months. 
This article was typical of the roving Western correspondent for its short­
sightedness; if only because Wright did not link the appalling poverty of the 
average Cambodian peasant with the real estate speculation and other corruption 
tolerated by the authorities ilf Phnom Penh. He comforted his reader by the 
apparent gloating over the Australian Government's speculative windfall and by 
saying the cash for the Australian Embassy purchase was "carefully audited at 
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both ends of the journey". The issue of what hap�ned to it after it was handed 
over to the Hun Sen administration remained unexplained. 136 
The same night as the Keating visit to Phnom Penh in September 1992 hit the 
evening news programs in Australia both Foreign i:;orrespondent (ABCTV) and 
Dateline (SBS-TV) current affairs programmes 13' screened similar items on 
Khmer Rouge business links with Thailand. Underlying this theme was the 
floated option of imposing an economic boycott on the Khmer Rouge if they 
refuse to disarm. Thus these programs served as almost a 'feasibility study' for 
an Evans initiative to move for economic sanctions against the Khmer Rouge 
should they fail to submit to disarmament before the UNT AC supervised 
elections in May 1993. 
Peter George's reporting for Foreign Correspondent was the more strident of the 
two presentations. He described Pailin, (the Khmer Rouge's 'de facto' provincial 
capital), as nothing more than a few dirt tracks with an obviously poverty 
stricken population of about 25,000. The suggestion was the money from timber 
and gems did not benefit the people here. True. But George did not raise the issue 
of how the people in Pailin fared when compared to the rest of the country. Nor 
did he state the obvious - that these rural peasants '.*'ere in receipt of none of the 
UN humanitarian aid lavished on Phnom Penh and other parts of the country 
under programs controlled by the other SNC factions. 
George suggested that he had convinced the Khmer Rouge into letting him ride 
in a jeep into Pailin under their escort. He tells the viewer he has been warned by 
the soldiers not to film the gem mining areas that dot the road into town. He 
'secretly' films but the Khmer Rouge escorts take no retaliatory action. No 
mention is made by George that he was part of an extensive Bangkok media 
contingent that had their visit to Pailin pre-arranged in advance by agreement 
between UNTAC and the NADK. 138 The purpose of this journey is to witness the 
arrival of UNTAC's civilian head, Mr Atashi in Pailin. The television viewer is 
left thinking the report must be giving the truth because of the danger the 
journalist went through to obtain it. 
The Dateline reporter was not so adventurous. Yet, her theme was the same as 
Foreign Correspondent - to link the Khmer Rouge's control over gems mining 
and timber logging trade with Thailand as a financial source of its arms 
purchases. The argument was that if an economic embargo was imposed on this 
trade it could prevent the Khmer Rouge undermining the peace process. The 
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logic here seems to be that a blockade of Khmer Rouge capitalism will stop them 
mounting a communist takeover at some later date. 
But there were other contradictions. The Dateline report revealed the Hun Sen 
regime actually exported more of Cambodia's timber stock over the Eastern side 
of Cambodia into Vietnam. Whether this income was also used for arms 
purchases was not disclosed. As one of the Khmer Rouge primary reasons for 
refusing the UNTAC mandate remained Vietnam's economic and demographic 
encroachment onto Khmer sovereignty it begs the question as to why there was 
no attempt by either current affairs program to examine the Cambodian­
Vietnamese border? A thorough monitoring of the Australian media for the 12 
month period up to February 1993 revealed only one brief mention of UNT AC' s 
inadequate supervision of the Vietnamese movements through the Eastern 
Cambodian border.139 
(i) How Australia's Domestic Immigration Policy 
Unhinged the Foreign Policy Line on Cambodia 
In October 199 1  the international media generated much speculation that the 
Khmer Rouge would forcibly repatriate refugees under their control in the Thai 
camps back over the border. The issue featured strongly in the international news 
sections of The Australian. 140 l}y March 1992 the emphasis switched to reports 
from CARE Australia executives over the growing difficulties of the logistics of 
the UN repatriation operation. The Herald Sun carried "Farce warning on 
refugees' return" while a Sydney Morning Herald editoriaJ 141 warned continuing 
fighting inside Cambodia may produce "a stampede in the other direction". The 
West Australian had "Foreign aid delays slow refugee work", complete with a 
photo of former Prime Minister Fraser as CARE Director touring resettlement 
sites at Battambang.142 A Newsweek feature, "The perilous road home", had Ron 
Moreau in Sisophon where "UN peacekeepers face their biggest challenge ever: 
repatriating thousands of Cambodian refugees - and keeping the Khmer Rouge 
at bay".143 
But concern with the civil liberties of the repatriated refugees from the Thai 
camps, or for that matter those facing repatriation from Hong Kong to Vietnam, 
became overshadowed in the Australian media in the wake of the arrival of a new 
influx of Cambodian 'boat people' on Australia's Northern shores. These new 
arrivals, augmented by Chinese· 'boat people' arriving as 'economic refugees' off 
the West Australian coast near Port Hedland, became a major media event. The 
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arrivals coincided with an upsurge of domestic concern in Australia over 
continued immigration at a time of high unemployment. 
A sample of the press will demonstrate this new :found concern. The Sydney 
Morning Herald editorial on immigration in late)anuary 1992'44 noted that 
immigration Minister Hand distanced himself from PM Keating's claim that the 
Liberal opposition's policy had racist overtones. The editorial called for an 
informed debate on the issue of immigration. It generally supported moves by the 
government to end the "unintended imbalance" caused by the "humanitarian 
assistance program", exacerbated by the new boat people arrivals. It called also 
for the government to dispel the myth that we were "being swamped by Asian 
immigration and the false alarm about a dramatic increase in the number of boat 
people heading for our northern shores". In the same breath, the editorial 
demanded a new immigration/refugee intake balance that was more closely 
geared to labour market requirements. '45 In February The Herald'46 editorial "The 
refugees and the rorter" supported the Government's decision to 'streamline' the 
assessment process over refugee status. It said Minister Hand's reference to 
'rorters' using legal delaying tactics to postpone or alter their repatriation after 
failing the refugee test was 'tough talk'. However the paper advocated 
'flexibility' in enforcement to avoid miscarriages ol' justice. Then in early April 
1992 the popular tabloid Daily Telegraph Mirror'47 blew up a Keating interview 
on the SBSTV program Dateline the previous evening where he forecast a cut in 
immigration for the coming year. Keating refused to be drawn on whether the 
thirty eight Cambodian boat people who were refused refugee status should be 
allowed to remain in Australia on humanitarian grounds because the matter was 
before the courts. 
Four days later a page three report "Cambodians escape custody" in the same 
paper threw fuel on the fire. Four of the rejected Cambodian detainees carried out 
a desperate escape from a Sydney detention centre. Under pressure the 
government was reported as backing down by admitting a 'defect' in the 
screening process.148 Telegraph cartoonist Warren's cartoon the same day 
pictured a refugee looking down an open drain with the sign 'hope' indicating his 
way out. 149 The implication was the Federal Government had bungled and was 
insensitive. In mid-April, The Australian 's editorial "Our inept refugee 
program"150 concluded that the government's new restriction were justified but 
the "erratic feature of the present system" meant we may as well let the 400 boat 
people stay. 
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A letter in the Sydney Morning Herald 151  argued, "(that) returning refugees will 
not be killed by Cambodian authorities, although they may be killed in a civil war 
or by the Khmer Rouge." This highlighted the Government' s dilemma of arguing 
the peace process in Cambodia was working and it was safe for the Cambodians 
to return home. By May the government was really on the back foot152 and was 
depicted by the media as insensitive after rushing through changes to the 
Immigration Act, with Opposition support, to "derail" the appeal to the Federal 
Court by boat people. Mr Hand defended the action (specifically aimed at the 
boat people) by saying they arrived in Australia "illegally" and was aimed at 
heading off those trying to by-pass the system through legal appeals. 
The Sydney tabloid Daily Telegraph Mirror 153 banner page one headline "Hand 
gets tough, boat people warned as more arrive" where those on board the Chinese 
sampan arriving in Darwin, could be "thrown out of the country within weeks". 
We were told their arrival was the tenth since 1989. The Warren cartoon the same 
day had a stern-faced Hand ordering the boat people back into the water. The op­
ed column by Sue Williams was less convinced and added sarcastically, 
They fled a country soaked in the blood of more than a million citizens cut 
down by the Khmer Rouge. But naturally, uppermost in their minds was the 
chance of a nice little mansion in Point Piper ... Last week, continued fighting 
in Cambodia left seven solqiers dead, and 22 more injured in the worst 
violations of the UN sponsored ceasefire so far. If it gets any worse, we may 
well pull out our troops. If this ragged little group of desperate people are 
pushed screaming and sobbing into the next plane, it will forever shame any 
reputation we have left for fairness, justice and compassion. 154 
Clearly, the government's need to tighten up on immigration ran counter to its 
foreign policy line of arguing that the Cambodian peace process was on track 
(and the returnees had nothing to fear in going back to Cambodia). The 'Chinese 
student' option - a temporary moratorium - had been cut-off by the political 
perception that Hawke had made a mistake in his 1989 emotional decision. 
The media remained divided. The counter-view advocating realpolitik on 
sovereignty and immigration was advanced by P.P. McGuiness with his article 
"We must not surrender to boat people blackmail". 155 In the Sydney Sunday 
Telegraph the influential commentator John Laws, weighed in and warned that 
immigration was not about Australia "providing a giant soup kitchen in the 
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Southern Hemisphere" and accused the Federal Government of not having an 
immigration policy. 156 By June the issue came to.a head with a David Jenkins 
investigative feature in the Sydney Morning Herald, "Destination Darwin", with 
a huge map showing the conspiratorial route of Chinese boat people into 
Australia. "The latest wave of boat people sees a.risky path and a better life; 
Australia sees a refugee racket and a growing threat, writes David Jenkins". 157 
In mid-June Mr Justice Einfield addressed the National Press Club on behalf of 
National Refugee Week. His widely reported criticism of the government's 
handling of the boat people crisis had a softening impact on the media line. The 
Sydney Morning Herald 158 referred to the Einfield 'broadside'. The paper 
criticised Einfield's argument about the privileged..position of Chinese students 
when Cambodian boat people face a more desperate situation. Chinese students 
benefited by a "one off Prime Ministerial intervention in usual procedures", an 
"exception", a 'quirk of history' .  
Paradoxically, this exception alarmed "many people" and led to the current hard­
line, thus making it more difficult for the Cambodian boat people. The paper 
argued, "Australia cannot afford to send a signal to potential illegal immigrants 
- by lenient treatment of Cambodian boat people').Y et our immigration policy 
should be "a balance" between "sentiment alone" and "ruthless efficiency of 
bureaucracy". More importantly, the paper concluded that immigration 
" ... involves broader foreign policy considerations, including to begin with, what 
action we can take to preventing repressive regimes (causing people) to flee their 
homes." 
The editorial broadly reflected an emerging media and community consensus as 
politicians ducked for cover and generally sought to shift media attention to other 
issues. Keating and Evans let the Immigration Minister carry the can and they 
concentrated on promoting the "positive" aspects of our 'push to Asia'. The issue 
became buried amid claim and counter-claim involving Hand's portfolio, the 
courts, lawyers and bureaucrats. 159 Foreign Minister Evans ran cold on the issue 
lest it impact on the unravelling shortcomings of his Cambodian peace plan. By 
the time the Federal elections arrived in early 1993 Keating could proudly 
announce to the media figures which showed a massive drop in immigration 
levels without a whimper being raised about the status of the detained 
Cambodian boat people. 
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(j) The Australian Media on Cambodia in the 1 993 
Lead-up to the May Elections 
Coverage of Cambodia in the Australian media during 1993 has been sporadic. 
The decision by the UN Security Council to proceed with the elections without 
the participation of the Khmer Rouge brought the diplomatic aspects of the Paris 
agreement back into focus in January. There was much media speculation about 
whether UNT AC had been a failure and whether the UN Security Council had 
the mandate to change the UNT AC brief from peace keepers to peace enforcers. 
Attention was drawn to the general break down of law and order and the decision 
to send an Australian judge to Cambodia as part of an enhanced judicial/law 
enforcement role to be adopted by UNTAC. 
Most media attention was directed towards demonstrating the positive role of the 
Australian contingent of UNTAC force. To this end the Melbourne Herald Sun 
has run a regular column penned by one of the officer serving in Cambodia. In 
March, a week long series of reports from Sally Neighbour was run on ABC 
News and A TV News covering such issues as a profile on Australian Khmer 
refugees who returned to help with reconstruction and running the election, the 
problems of resettlement for the returnees from the Thai border camps and 
Australian soldiers running English speaking courses in their spare time. 
Other issues featured in the media include the capture, hostage taking, and 
subsequent release, of both military and civilian UNTAC personnel after they 
had crossed into Khmer Rouge controlled areas. Political assassinations of 
electoral workers was another issue. Here the evidence pointed towards agents 
of the Hun Sen administration. However, the Khmer Rouge were accused of 
responsibility by the Hun Sen faction. The Australian media left the issue of 
blame unresolved but, more often than not, suggested Khmer Rouge culpability. 
A similar pattern emerged with the random massacres of groups of Vietnamese 
civilians. While both the Khmer Rouge and KPNLF had been expressing public 
dissatisfaction with the UNTAC's inability to contain the flow of new settlers 
from Vietnam into Cambodia, the massacres were almost universally blamed on 
the Khmer Rouge faction. However official Khmer Rouge denials were carried 
in the various reports. 
On the ABC's Report From Asia in March, Indochina correspondent Evan 
Williams reported from Phnom Penh on the issue of "ethnic violence". He 
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interviewed the UNHCR Director Denis McNamara who expressed concern at 
the attacks on Vietnamese settlers. He argued "the nature of UNT AC had 
changed because of the failure of cantonment.", He argued the UN Security 
Council had reiterated the mandate included "protective security" of those 
participating in the electoral process. UNT AC was:Cmpowered to launch special 
prosecutions to act as a clear deterrent to ethnic violence, but without 
"superseding the local authorities". 160 
All this demonstrates that the attempts to impose the electoral solution on 
Cambodia in 1993, without first resolving the basic grievances of the Khmer 
factions - sovereignty, power sharing arrange!llents, confirmation of the 
Vietnamese withdrawal - was a fundamental flaw in the UN bartered peace. It 
was a flaw in which much of the Western media share responsibility. Had they 
done their homework better in the lead up to the May 1993 elections then the 
inevitable debacle may have been avoided, or at least minimised. 
Part of the explanation for this shortcoming relates to what media analyst and 
academic Rod Tiffen pointed out in his 1978 book on "newsmaking" in 
Southeast Asia, 
. . .  News values, assumptions about audience interests and attitudes, the 
production and format demands of news organisations, the differing priority 
and authority accorded to different news sources, all constitute a very 
considerable and limiting prism through which Southeast Asian news is 
filtered to Australia. 161 
The news on Cambodia is filtered in a number of ways at present. Firstly, by 
what Australian foreign correspondents inside Cambodia regard as newsworthy. 
This can often be influenced by their sources. Secondly, it is filtered by the fact 
that there are still only a very small number of journalists who are regularly 
reporting on Cambodia. In Australia only a mere handful of reporters cover 
foreign affairs. The quality of their work is mixed with regionally based reports 
not always superior in quality to Australian sourced material. Thirdly, it is 
filtered by the continued dominance over the media of large institutions who 
forever constrict what can be legitimately reported - either because of 
commercial or political reasons. 
In developing an 'Asianist' or 'Cambodianist' perspective, Australian journalists 
should be wary making any concessions, or engaging in self-censorship, or 
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offering succour, to those reactionary regional leaders of whatever political 
persuasion who suppress their own people and then hide behind the slogan of 
"We do it differently in Asia". But journalists should also remember the the 
Cambodian state as such, is a weak and divided one. It is much easier to write 
criticism of Cambodian political leaders than it is of Indonesian, Malaysian or 
even Fijian leaders. If our aim is national reconciliation and an internal, rather 
than external solution to Cambodia, then we should write accordingly. 
46 
Notes 
I. Search conducted for this paper by the autbc:>r. Colombo Plan aid and 
Sihanouk Royalty news were the most frequently mentioned. 
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'Heroic Journalism' and 'Western Conscience' approach is Frank Palmos's 
thriller fiction, 'Lucy", in Harper's Bazaar, Spring, 1989, pp.198-20 I, 230. 
3. One of the most recent examples was the television report from Kathleen 
Reen (Channel 7 Melbourne 11 AM program 12 March 1993) on the 
Australian Electoral Commission officers working on voter enrolments in 
Cambodia. The opening visual sequence was archival footage of Khmer 
soldiers approaching a bas relief of Angkor stone followed by camera close 
up of a row of skulls. The commentary which accompanied these shots was 
"Cambodia, the very name conjures up images of war and famine." 
4. M. Williams, The Land in Between: The Cambodia Dilemma. I 969, p.J 3. 
5. Noam Chomsky cites the works of Barron & Paul and Ponchaud (see 
below) as the seminal texts here. Micheal Vickery and others referred to 
this as the "Standard Total View'' of postwar Cambodia ( 1975-78). 
6. In a review of the book, Cambodia Watching Down Under (hereinafter as 
CWDU), as one of the key players in this 'revisionist' school Micheal 
Vickery denied that such influence existed. He argued writers such as 
himself (between 1980-88) were only able to get "one or two articles apiece 
in a major media organ, while the anti-Vietnam, and therefore anti-Phnom 
Penh side, usually right-wing extremists, had regular columnists in the 
major newspapers." (Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 23, 2 [1992] 439). 
Vickery seems to ignore a major tenet of Cambodia Watching, viz. there 
was 'elite ambivalence' in the Australian media. Most of the " right-wing 
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